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Pessimism as an IS Management Tool in the Public Sector:  Lessons from the 
INCIS Fiasco in the New Zealand Police Force 
 
The majority of information system (IS) developments are unsuccessful.1  The bigger 
the development, the more likely it will be unsuccessful.  While exact numbers are 
uncertain, and depend to some extent on how success is measured, something like 20 
to 25 percent of all projects are total failures, while 30-60 percent are partial failures.  
The minority are those counted as successes (Collins and Bicknell 1997; Heeks and 
Bhatnagar 1999; Heeks 2002; Iacovou 1999; James 1997; Korac-Boisvert and 
Kouzmin 1995).  In a US survey of IS projects by the Standish Group, for example, it 
was found that success rates varied from 59 percent in the retail sector, to 32 percent 
in the financial sector, to 27 percent in manufacturing, and 18 percent in government.  
Overall, the success rate was 26 percent.  Forty-six percent of projects had problems 
including being over budget and behind schedule, or being delivered with fewer 
functions and features than originally specified.  Twenty-eight percent failed 
altogether or were cancelled.  Cost overruns averaged nearly 200 percent.  This 
success rate varied dramatically by total project budget: at less than US$750 000 the 
success rate was 55 percent; with budgets over $10 million, no projects were 
successful (SIMPL/NZIER 2000).  Another survey found that between 30 and 40 
percent of all IS projects exhibited some degree of escalation (Keil, Mann, and Rai 
2000). 
 
The sums involved can be mind-boggling.  A study of IS developments (ISD) 
in the British public sector estimated that 20 percent of expenditure was wasted, while 
a further 30-40 percent led to no perceivable benefits (Wilcocks 1994).  In 1994 the 
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US General Accounting Office reported that the spending of over $200 Billion in the 
previous 12 years had led to few meaningful returns.  Collins and Bicknell (1997) 
estimated public sector failures in the UK have cost 5 billion pounds.  For example, 
the UK’s public health service Resource Management Initiative led to new 
Information Systems introduced into almost every hospital.  Despite the expenditure 
of hundreds of millions of pounds, few were successful ‘by any criteria’ (Heeks and 
Bhatnagar 1999, 59).  The Wessex Health authority’s Regional Information Systems 
Plan was cancelled after something between 43-60 million pounds (the actual figure 
was uncertain) had already been spent, with almost nothing achieved (Collins and 
Bicknell 1997).  A benefit payment scheme involving the British Post Office, the 
Department of Social Security and the computer company ICL, was abandoned after 
three years at the cost of 300 million pounds (Economist 2002).  An already obsolete 
air-traffic support system opened in Swanson, UK, in 2002, six years late and 180 
million pounds over budget (Economist 2002).  Vast sums of money, mostly provided 
by aid agencies, have been spent on health information systems in South Africa, on 
donor funded IS projects in China and on World Bank funded projects in Africa – all 
of which have been total or partial failures (Heeks 2002).  Spectacularly, the US 
Internal Revenue Service, with an annual computer budget of $8 Billion, has managed 
‘a string of project failures that have cost taxpayers $50 billion a year [mainly defined 
as revenue forgone] – roughly as much as the yearly net profit of the entire computer 
industry’ (James 1997, 1).   
 
New Zealand has not been immune to IS failures.  Recent public sector 
failures included a Health Waikato project which was abandoned at the cost of NZ$9 
million, the failure of a large part of a NZ$26 million project by Capital Cost Health, 
 4 
and the Landline project which was late and NZ$52 million over budget (Espiner 
2000).  In a report to the New Zealand Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
it was found that 38 percent of all private and public sector projects were judged a 
success, 59 percent were found to have involved problems and 3 percent were judged 
a complete failure or were cancelled.  Government success rates, at 38 percent, were 
slightly higher than private sector success rates, at 31 percent (SIMPL/NZIER 2000).   
At less than NZ$500 000 the success rate was 80 percent for the government and 41 
percent for the private sector, while at $2-10 million the failure rate was 20 (public) 
and 22 (private) percent.  At the over NZ$10 million mark, the success rate for both 
was zero.   
 
Drawing on published accounts, archival material obtained through the 
Official Information Act 1982 and interviews with contractors and government 
officials, we examine and draw lessons from the largest public sector IS failure in 
New Zealand’s history – the collapse of the Police Integrated National Crime 
Investigation System (INCIS).  INCIS was a highly ambitious development, to be 
based around yet-undeveloped technology, with 3125 personal computers linking all 
police stations to each other and to a national crime database.  It was promoted as 
improving criminal investigation and analysis for the police and as increasing their 
administrative and operational functions, all without increasing the demands on the 
police and government budget.  It would, it was claimed, save on paperwork, freeing 
up police for front line duties and leading to job savings.  However, after several years 
of cost and timetable overruns, management problems, and the non-delivery of 
applications, the project was abandoned in 1999 at the cost to the government, after an 
out-of-court settlement with IBM and sale of the project equipment, of around 
 5 
NZ$100 million.  This was for something that finally delivered little more than e-mail.  
The Police were left with an organisation ‘reengineered’ around a ‘Community 
Policing Strategy’, which was to be based around a functional INCIS system.  The 
loss of $100 million, mostly out of an annual Police budget of around $800 million,2 
put severe pressure on Police budgets.  Although problems with INCIS were 
increasingly reported in the media over the life of the project, Government monitoring 
regimes were ineffective in controlling the project.  The INCIS fiasco encouraged a 
report by a select committee of the New Zealand parliament and a Ministerial inquiry, 
and a review of IT monitoring regimes in the public sector.  It was not until a change 
of government that the project was admitted to be a failure.   
 
While having some unique characteristics, the INCIS fiasco showed many of 
the traits of the typical failed IS project.  These included highly overblown 
expectations regarding IS; the attempted development of new and unproven 
technology; management and reporting problems; a naive faith in contracts to control 
development and seek redress when things went wrong; and increasing the complexity 
of the project through specification changes and organisational restructuring.  While 
there is a large body of literature on IS failures proposing a variety of solutions to the 
problem, we argue that these searches for ‘silver bullets’ or ‘techniques’, whether the 
latest management fad or new programming technology, largely miss the point and 
are possibly doomed to failure.  Instead, we propose an approach to IS development in 
the public sector that is often lacking in projects: that of pessimism.  This is the belief 
that in general the processes of software and IS development are so complex, so full 
of uncertainty, so ridden with human error, the clash of personalities and interests, the 
dysfunctions found in organisations and so on, that large projects will generally fail.  
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These problems are inherent in the development of these large and complex projects, 
and cannot be simply fixed by new and better technology, by superior management 
structures or the appointment of hero-managers.  Pessimism is an explicit rejection of 
the naive faith and optimism placed in technological and management fixes, and the 
promises of IS salesman and consultants.  Instead it argues that large, optimistic and 
ambitious IS change should be avoided in the public sector.  It recommends a public 
manager as a curmudgeonly, risk-adverse, sceptical and suspicious adopter of 
technology – virtually the opposite of the business-like entrepreneurial manager of 
new public management ideology – standing back from the whirl of the flash and new, 
and instead supporting the proven, the modest, the uninspiring, the possibly grey 
promises of smaller adaptation of technology, of incremental change to management 
processes - if indeed adopting new technology is desirable at all.   
 
The INCIS Project  
In the 12 years before INCIS at least six major Police IT systems had been 
implemented, most of which had failed to progress for a variety of reasons, including 
a lack of support from the organization (Sapphire 1994).  This did not discourage 
further projects however, and Police were keen to move away from the mainframe-
based system known as the ‘Wanganui computer’.  This was essentially a powerful 
record keeping system that first went into operation in December 1976 and had grown 
incrementally since through various upgrades.   
 
The origins of INCIS go back as far as 1985 when Project Serious Incident 
Computer Applications began in April.  In November 1990, Azimuth Consulting 
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reported on a number of IS requirements for Police Systems, which include INCIS.  
This was further developed by Police.  A Price Waterhouse Report of 13 November 
1991 made a number of suggestions on the concept of INCIS and they were then 
contracted to further develop the project.  In December 1991 a scoping study was 
delivered.  A proposal was presented to what was called the National System Steering 
Committee on 10 September 1992, and the Police Executive Committee authorised 
the project team to issue as a request for information (RFI), a request for tender (RFT) 
and to prepare a business plan to present to Cabinet (Small 2000, 35).  The RFI was 
issued in November 1992 and sent to 141 potential suppliers, with 69 responses 
received.  Of these, four were selected and sent a RFT, requesting a fixed price 
contract.  Tenders were received from Andersen Consulting and IBM, with an 
evaluation favouring IBM.  Both were asked to rebid, and these were analysed on the 
INCIS Project Tender Rebid Evaluation of 12 July 1993, which was again favourable 
to the IBM tender.  The INCIS business case was prepared by Police by May 12th, 
1993, with Tony Crewdson, the future project director, instrumental in its 
development. This was extremely ambitious, outlining a series of functions that were 
not in existence elsewhere.  That police ambitions were great was confirmed by Police 
visits overseas in 1993 which could not find similar systems in operation and Tony 
Crewdson, the INICS project manager noted that no one else had yet developed a 
system that ‘met the needs’ of police (Jackson 1998).  This should have immediately 
rung alarm bells that these ‘needs’ may have been somewhat ambitious. 
 
INCIS was to be a highly ambitious project, combining all police databases 
and linking them to all stations through a network of 3125 PCs.   Police would be to 
enter their notes directly onto PCs and be directly interfaced with other aspects of the 
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Justice system.  Proposed ‘speedbooks’ would allow relevant files to updated 
automatically as data was entered.  It was claimed that INCIS would deliver benefits 
of $NZ5337.7 million over its lifetime.  This included the freeing up 1.9 million hours 
of police time annually, at a benefit of $72.3 million.  This was to be delivered 
through reduced paperwork, a flatter hierarchy and improved work-flows.  It would 
also save around $14.2 million on the systems then being used – the LES and NIS (the 
Wanganui computer).  Funds would also be generated by allowing other departments 
to use INICS on a ‘user pays’ basis, and by expected overseas sales revenues of $45 
million over the life of the project.   It also promised a number of other benefits such 
as increased officer safety, improved crime prevention and detection and an improved 
relationship with the community.  These promised benefits were extremely optimistic, 
to say the least, if not verging on the fantastic.  Some feeling for the huge complexity 
of INCIS can be given by the large numbers of staff engaged in its development: by 
the time of its termination, 25 IBM employees, 125 contractors and an ‘unspecified 
number of police staff’ were involved in the project (Beynen 1999, 1). 
 
The police consulted with various government departments, including the 
central agencies and Ministry of Justice who ‘believed that an integrated approach to 
the development of IT systems in the area of criminal justice if maximum efficiency 
benefits were to be obtained’ (Waitai 1999).  A review by Ernst and Young, dated 22 
July 1993, commissioned jointly by the Treasury and Police to report on ‘strategic 
considerations’, the Business Case and the preferred IBM bid, concluded that the 
INCIS case was ‘based on a sound technical solution’, was ‘ consistent with the 
corporate strategy of Police,’ and that it had ‘a well argued business case for an 
affirmative investment decision’ (Ernst & Young 1993, 4).  However the report raised 
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a number of reservations, including the level of overseas development involved, the 
need for ‘proof of technical viability and deliverability’, and the need for the 
implementation plan to be competed before the completion of the contract 
negotiations (Ernst & Young 1993, 8).3  The Minister of IT, Maurice Williamson, also 
noted a number of concerns with the "INSYS" (sic) project in a meeting with the 
Police Commissioner, including the long-time viability of the planned OS/2 operating 
system and the possible costs and delays of converting this to Windows NT, ‘the 
grandiose’ nature of the project and problems with training and support (Williamson 
1993).4  A Request for Proposal was issued to IBM on 3 December 1993.  On 31 
January 1994, KPMG recommended continuing with OS/2 and reported that the 
INCIS project was consistent with the Police Information Technology Strategy (Small 
2000, 40).   
  
After various papers were presented to March and April in 1994, Cabinet 
approved the proposal, which had changed somewhat from the original business plan.5  
The cost was now estimated to be $203.64 million, with capital expenditure 
comprising $98.7 million and operating expenditure comprising $105.81 million.  
This was to be spread over the lifetime of the project of eight years including the 
expected two and a half years of development.  The Government was to contribute 
$62 million in capital contributions, while the Police would fund the rest within its 
existing budget.  The efficiency gains, mainly to be delivered by saving of around 11 
percent of the hours worked by policy personnel, were expected to deliver $380 
million, with 30 percent to be delivered to the Crown.6  These savings were mainly to 
be delivered by reducing sworn personnel by 540 by June 2000 (Waitai 1999).  Even 
within the government, Police projections on INCIS were treated with some 
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scepticism (Fisk 1993).  KPMG advised again that the Police should continue with 
OS/2.  On 31 August Price Waterhouse withdrew from the project, and the Project 
Manager, Carr, now with Sapphire Technology Limited, prepared a handover report.  
This noted a number of problems and risks with INCIS (Sapphire 1994).   These were 
seen to be manageable by the Project Sponsor. 
 
The INCIS project begins  
Following Cabinet approval, the Police completed negotiations with IBM and signed 
the contract in September 1994.  The INCIS Request for Proposal (RFP)7 and contract 
amounted to over 4,000 pages, the largest IT contract in New Zealand’s public sector 
history, and possibly the largest IT contract, public or private, in New Zealand’s 
history.  The Police then established an INCIS project team with Superintendent Tony 
Crewdson as Project Director.  Crewdson had no experience in the management of 
large IT projects.  To manage the organizational change and restructuring that was to 
accompanying INCIS, a Change Management Team was established, reporting 
directly to Deputy Commissioner of Resource Management (and later Commissioner) , 
Peter Doone.  Doone was initially the INCIS project sponsor, appointed in June 1993.  
Price Waterhouse was appointed to audit the INICS project in December 1994.  
 
The INCIS program was designed to be delivered in two sections.  The first 
was to install PC networks in all Police stations replacing the Wanganui systems ‘with 
new Suspect and Offence Information Systems, Crime Trend Analysis, Intelligence 
Analysis and Mail Facilities.’  The second was to implement a ‘Case and 
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Investigation System’ early in 1997 (Small 2000, 28).  This later changed to iterations 
one, two and three (with Release one) and then to Increment One, Two and Three.   
 
The delivery of the first release of INCIS was scheduled for April 1995, with 
the second (with new INCIS applications) in July 1995.  However, problems were 
evident from the first and projected completion dates slipped.  The ‘INCIS Liaison 
Update Newsletter’ of January 1995 projected the first release as being completed by 
the end of 1996, and the second implemented in early 1997, but in January 1995 
Cabinet papers proposed the first delivery in March 1997, the second for December.  
Costs were also blowing-out.  The INCIS Project Status Report of June 1995 noted 
the ‘effort and resources required to complete… will be considerably larger than 
originally anticipated (Crewdson 1995, 13).  The October 1995 Price Waterhouse 
report reiterated noted that the slippage in delivery dates was of concern. 
 
INCIS began with a supposedly complete specification in the Request for 
Proposal and contract. However, the Police and IBM project teams became aware 
during February/March 1995 that the Contract specifications were not detailed enough 
to begin the design of INCIS, and so between March and October 1995 operations 
“Discovery” 1 and 2 were carried out to create detailed specifications for the 
implementation of the INCIS applications.    
 
Management problems soon became evident.  The Sapphire report of August 
31st, 1994 noted ‘Police has been very slow in making decisions. This appears to be 
worsening, rather than improving.’  In May 1995 partnering meetings between IBM 
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and the Police were abandoned and replaced by an Executive Control Group to try to 
reduce the dependence on IBM.   This was supported by the Police director of IT 
(Batchelor) but opposed by the INCIS Project Director (Crewdson).  Personality 
disputes between the two became particularly heated as Batchelor and Crewdson 
offered his resignation during 1995 (Waitai 1999).  Bachelor even claimed that the 
report of December 1996 on the project was misleading (something denied by Doone 
(1999))8, called into question Crewdson's competence, and saw Crewdson as having 
too close ties to IBM (Justice and Law Reform Committee 1999).  For his part, 
Bachelor was instrumental in pushing for specification changes that increased the 
complexity of the project.  The relationship was particularly complicated, as while 
Crewdson had been appointed ‘Project Director’ in October 1994, this was somewhat 
of a misnomer and he reported to Greg Batchelor, appointed as Director of IT in 
November 1994, something that he was not necessarily comfortable with (Justice and 
Law Reform Committee 1999).  
 
Technology changes were also signalled within the first year of the project 
with police considering making changes to the wide area network, the local area 
network and the desk top operating systems. In May 1996, the Police requested that 
the ‘client’ operating system be changed from IBM’s OS/2 to Microsoft Windows NT.   
The linking of Windows NT desktops to OS/2 server login was ‘world first’ 
development and Police were advised by IBM that an immediate move to Windows 
NT desktops and an OS/2 server was not feasible with the technology available at that 
time.  This decision to switch from OS/2 was also not supported by Crewdson, the 
project director, but was by the I & T Director, Greg Bachelor and Maurice 
Williamson, the Minister of IT (Matthews 1996).  In July 1996, IBM advised the 
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police that guarantees in regard to the performance and response time were to be 
waived because of the change to Windows NT and the network. The Police, however, 
pressed ahead and agreement was reached on 14 October 1997.  IBM absorbed an 
additional $10 million for the cost of the changeover, while Police contributed $1.5 
million.  Police also pushed for a change from the Token Ring Local Area network to 
Ethernet, despite two evaluations supporting the Token ring.  After negotiation, 
‘customer preference’ was the reason imposed by Police for the changes.  The Wide 
Area Network was also changed, avoiding the usual change process and without 
competitive tendering (Waitai 1999).  
 
 In March 1996 Price Waterhouse reported: 
At its half way point the project faces a number of serious issues that may prevent its 
completion on time and within budget. Project management note that there is little or no 
contingency remaining and we believe that there is legitimate reason for concern at this point 
that the delivery dates will not be met.  
 
The key issue facing the project at present is the selection of the appropriate system 
architecture for the INCIS project and the impact this decision has on the project deadlines and 
on the overall Police I&T strategy. At that date of this report the review is still to be finalised 
(Price Waterhouse 1996, 2). 
Price Waterhouse described the INCIS project as high risk in a June report, but in 
later reports described INCIS as very high risk.  However, Police reports continued to 
reassure the government that the project was achievable, despite the difficulties.  In a 
December 1996 response to the Price Waterhouse report, Crewdson noted that Police 
and IBM Project management saw the project as high risk and noted that delays in the 
provision of information from IBM had heightened this perception of risk, but saw the 
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‘potential cost exposure’ as manageable with IBM ‘willing to make substantial 
concessions’. Crewdson also noted that the establishment of a Project Steering 
Committee and that the recruitment of ‘highly skilled’ technicians and management 
would ensure adequate control (Crewdson 1996).9  
 
By early 1997 monitoring agencies were aware the project was facing difficulties.  
In February the Treasury were already voicing concern regarding the reporting on 
INCIS, noting the non-production of the September 1996 INCIS report (Secretary to 
1997a), while the State Services Commission noted ‘whispers’ about the state of the 
INCIS project, including that the project was ‘at least 6 months behind schedule’ and 
that the ‘Police's current funding proposals [included] a request for reinstatement of 
$10 million a year which represents much of the promised INCIS savings’(Rapley 
1997) .  In March the Secretary for the Treasury wrote to the Treasurer and the 
Minister of Finance noting that INCIS was ‘behind schedule by 9 months’ and 
‘forecast to cost $104 million, rather than the original budget of $97 million’ with the 
‘potential for additional cost overruns (Secretary for the Treasury 1997b).’  
 
In response to such concerns, a joint review was commissioned by the Treasury 
and Police, to be conducted by Andersen Consulting. Andersen reported in May 1997 
that around $55 million had been expended or incurred of the $95 million budget, 
with projected cost overruns of $8 million.  It also reported that the project was eight 
to twelve months behind schedule. While Andersen noted there was ‘considerable 
risk’ associated with the project, it recommended it be continued and that Police better 
manage the project and contract.  The Treasury were aware the situation was even 
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more serious than Andersen allowed, noting in June that the cost overruns of INCIS 
could be $20-50 million, and discussing the possibility of project termination 
(Treasury 1997).    
 
In response to these problems, an Executive Control Group was established 
consisting of the Deputy Commissioner of Police, the Police Director of Information 
and Technology, the Police INCIS project director, the Managing Director of IBM 
(NZ), the Solutions Integration Manager (IBM Asia Pacific) and Project Manager 
(IBM NZ).  The group was to meet fortnightly to monitor and review the project.  In 
March 1997 the then director of Police IT, Greg Bachelor, resigned.  In June 1997 the 
INCIS Project Internal Audit noted the continual ‘deterioration in the relationship 
between IBM and Police’, the ‘lack of access to IBM personnel’ and the inability or 
unwillingness of IBM to respond to questions in writing (Price Waterhouse Coopers 
1997, 2). 
 
In September 1997 a fundamental change was made to the software system 
architecture: the new and untried (and ultimately unsuccessful) software technology 
of distributed OO client/server was replaced with a conventional three-tier 
client/server architecture, with INCIS applications to run on IBM's proprietary CICS 
(applications environment) and MVS (mainframe operating system) platform.10  The 
fundamental software architecture of INCIS was completely changed, which required 
substantial respecification and rewriting of the system.  A magazine article by 
Chamberlain (1997, 43) noted INCIS ‘was due to be operational in March this year 
[1997] but hitches (chiefly a switch from IBM OS2 to a Windows system) have put it 
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a year behind’.  However, as a former contractor noted in an interview, the INCIS 
software implementation was at the time being completely restarted.  A further 
systems analysis, Operation Obstat, was carried out from 18 September to 31 
November 1997 to respecify what was required to complete the INCIS contract, and 
on Dec 5th, 1997, Police and IBM signed a deed of variation of contract. The 
variation involved the commitment of a further $20 million for more development 
work.   According to interviews, IBM threatened to withdraw from the project unless 
this amount was forthcoming.  This sum was contracted for by Police without the 
required authority from Cabinet, and a Cabinet minute of May 18th, 1998, directed a 
review of the contractual arrangements between Police and IBM. The Treasury only 
became aware of the contractual variation from the press.  The Cabinet moved to 
accommodate the unauthorised expenditure, but directed that the Police 
Commissioner's delegated spending authority be reviewed (Waitai 1999).   The 
ministers of Finance, Police and the Associate Treasurer of directed that an 
independent external review of Police administrative and management levels and 
structures be carried out ‘in order to identify opportunities for achieving efficiency 
[financial] savings’ (Minister of Police t al 1998). 
 
In October 1997 rumours were circulating in the Police and outside the 
government that delays in the INCIS project were due to ‘costly cockups’ 
(Chamberlain 1997, 43).   The IT project director Tony Crewdson, noted that the 
‘reality is we can't prove [the benefits] until the thing is up and running.  We are not 
dazzled by technology. It's only a tool.  Used wisely, tools can provide a lot of relief. 
However, Chamberlain reported that ‘police of all ranks are sneeringly cynical at the 
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notion that being able to take a laptop in the squad car will compensate for fewer 
staff.’   
 
From December 1997 to August 1998 IBM delivered more than 3,000 
workstations and associated hardware to the Police.  This represented a significant 
proportion of the value of the contract to IBM.  However, almost no INCIS 
applications were available at this stage.   The cost of infrastructure ‘appeared to be 
the full retail price without any significant reduction for bulk or other factors. It is 
perceived that the pricing of hardware cross subsidised, to some degree, IBM software 
costs’ (Small 2000, 152).   
 
In May 1998 the Cabinet approved a further $1 million to strengthen the project 
management.  An external expert was recruited as INCIS project manager in October 
1998 and a KPMG Peat Marwick partner was appointed to the INCIS Executive 
Control Group.  There was also pressure on Crewdson to resign with the SSC noting 
that ‘the incumbent project director has been off-site since May and Police are 
negotiating with him about his future employment within, or outside of Police." 
(Provost 1998).  Crewdson left the INCIS project in May 1998 and the Police in 
October 1998, to be replaced by Stewart Watson.   
 
In the face of continual questions regarding INCIS, an Ad Hoc Official Committee 
for IT Monitoring was also established in May 1998 chaired by the Deputy State 
Services Commissioner.  The Police were required to report monthly to the committee. 
In June 1998, Andersen Consulting presented a report examining to what extent the 
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Police had complied with the previous report of May 1997.  As the Treasury noted, 
the revised contract ‘did not include end to end performance guarantees...’, while it 
was noted the Police did not explore options to the project, and the project timetable 
had ‘no allowance for delays nor was a specific amount of money set aside for cost 
overruns as is normally the case with large projects (Shennan 1999).’ 
 
To allay their concerns, the Treasurer Winston Peter and the Secretary to the 
Treasury visited senior IBM executives in New York.  Assurances were given that the 
project would be completed, although no timeframe was given, and IBM made 
available additional staff to work on the project.  A law firm, Philip Fox, was engaged 
by the Police and Treasury to undertake a review of the varied contract, in the wake of 
the extra unauthorised $20.17 million allocated.  Police then notified other 
government officials in February 1999 that further delays were expected.  The 
progress of increment 1 and 2 were reviewed, and it was found ‘that increment 1 was 
being managed in accordance with the best practice project management techniques’ 
(Waitai 1999) (!) Police also received a detailed project plan from IBM for increment 
2.  Bordering on the ludicrous, the "INCIS Increment Two Project Scope Review" 
stated in April that ‘Police appeared to have managed this project extremely well, to 
the point of calling it ‘perfect project management.’’   However termination of the 
project was already being considered with a Police letter to the SSC listing a number 
of implications for the cancellation of INCIS, including legal liability to IBM for up to 
the full value of the contract ($94M) less funds paid to date ($67M), and releasing 
IBM from liability for $30M in extra application development costs (Matthews 1998). 
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On Jan 11th, 1999 the Ad-Hoc Committee on IT claimed ‘mechanisms have 
been put in place to facilitate effective management of the identified risks’ and 
estimated the cost to complete the INCIS project at $119 million (Mathews 1999, 5-6).  
A report by the in early 1999 by the Gibraltar Groups estimated that the cost to 
complete INCIS would now be in the region of capital costs of $156 million and 
operating costs rising to $70 million in 2000/2001, with a likely extension of 12 
months over its expected June 1999 completion (Soar 1999).  The expected 
completion date moved out to May 2000 for increment 1 and November 2000 for 
increment 2, and the Treasury were aware that the slippages, which they blamed on 
IBM, were becoming out of control.  While continuing the project was also canvassed, 
the abandonment of the project was also being openly considered (Treasury 1999). 
Because of the delays of INCIS, the LES police IT system also required alterations to 
enable it to run after the year 2000 (i.e.: to fix the ‘Y2K bug’) (SSC 1999).  In an 
interview with the authors, an SSC official noted that by March 1999, State Services 
Commission personnel, now closely involved with the governance of INCIS had 
formed the opinion that IBM could not ‘deliver the goods’ for the INCIS contract.  
They decided the best option was to halt the project, and negotiate a graceful exit.  In 
May, the Treasurer, Bill Bitch notified Cabinet that IBM has informally advised 
officials ‘that it does not intend to complete Increment Two of INCIS due to the time 
and cost of completion..." (Birch 1999, 1).  Investigations were then made into two 
alternatives to INCIS: PULSE, used by the Irish police, and VersaTerm, used by the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police.  
 
In June 1999, a Ministerial Group was established with a brief to review and 
monitor the project. This contained front-bench senior ministers including the 
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powerful ‘minister for everything’ Treasurer Bill Birch, the Minister of Finance Bill 
English, as well as the Ministers of Commerce, Police and Associate minister of State 
Services.  The Chief executives of the Treasury, State Services Commission and the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, and the Police Commissioner, were 
required to oversee the INCIS and report to the ministerial group.  There was intense 
media interest in the INCIS project at this stage, but public statements from the 
government and Police continued to indicate that INCIS would be continued.  The 
Police Association chairman, Greg O’Conner, criticised INCIS, saying it ‘has not 
impacted on any police officers' lives’ and ‘so far, it's only being used by the 
intelligence people’ (Bell 1999, 24). The Justice and Law Reform Select Committee 
of the New Zealand parliament were also becoming increasingly concerned and 
requested that the Audit Office review the protect – a request the Office was unable to 
fulfil in totality due to some issues being sub judice (Waitai 1999).  
 
The Death of INCIS 
According to an interview with one contractor, IBM had threatened to withdraw as 
early as late 1997, and discussion about termination within the government goes back 
at least as far.  As the Treasurer noted in May, IBM informally advised officials that it 
did not intend to complete increment 2 and the government was began canvassing its 
options in response (Birch 1999).   However the INCIS project officially ended in 
early August 1999 when IBM advised the Police that it would not continue work on 
INCIS without renegotiating the contract to include further payment.  The public 
response of the Police and Government was that IBM should continue work under the 
existing conditions and terms of payment. The Treasurer Bill Birch argued that since 
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there was a fixed-price contract, IBM should deliver the goods for this price.  IBM 
then repudiated the contract on August 17th.  The government publicly stated that 
IBM could not walk away from the contract.  IBM, however, insisted that ‘the 
goalposts have been moving since day one’ and that it was owed ‘a substantial 
amount of money’ (Brown 1999, 1-1).  
 
On 17 August 1999 the Attorney-General filed proceedings against IBM in the 
High Court at Wellington. The Crown sought judgement in relation to three causes of 
action and sought various forms of relief, including two sums over $3 million 
(excluding GST). A Statement of Defence and Counterclaim was then filed by IBM 
seeking $75 million and court costs in compensation for losses it claimed it sustained 
from the project.  IBM maintained from Tokyo that they had ‘met their contractual 
obligations [and] have done more than required.  We are very proud of what we have 
already delivered which has resulted in a modernisation of police computer services 
(Beynen 1999, 1)’.  One hundred and twenty five contractors working on the project 
were made redundant, while of the 25 IBM employees, between ‘10 and 20’ were to 
stay on as ‘part of the company’s maintenance obligations [with] the rest “reassigned’ 
within IBM’ (Beynen 1999, 1).  Subsequently, the government and IBM settled out of 
court.  IBM paid the Crown $NZ25 million, while the Crown paid IBM $NZ18 
million for work already completed (Evening Post 1999).  The mainframe was sold at 
a reported price of $1 million, knocked down from the original cost of $7.6 million.  
Commissioner Peter Doone took early retirement after a controversy involving his 
partner, while deputy commissioner Barry Matthews left to take up a senior post in 




An initial Commission of Inquiry was abandoned in favour of a Ministerial 
inquiry, headed by Dr Francis Small, which reported to the Minister of Justice in the 
newly elected Labour Government on 19 October 2000 (Small 2000).  In April 2001, 
the Government indicated that it would accept all the recommendations from the 
report (Mallard 2001).   The reports on the failure of INCIS led the State Services 
Commission (SSC) and other agencies to introduce new policies and requirements for 
the approval and monitoring of large IT projects (SSC 2001). 
 
After the INCIS failure, Police needed substantial additional funding to pay 
for the project including a $94.6 million injection of funds during 2000.  This 
included a $66 million write-down for computer hardware, software and network 
costs associated with the INCIS failure.  The drain on the Police budget caused by 
INCIS led to buildings not being maintained and fleets of cars not being upgraded 
during 1996-98 (Hawkins 2001a; Hawkins 2001b).  In the end, INCIS provided little 
more than a highly expensive e-mail system, and a number of terminals to the 
Wanganui computer.   
 
In April 2001, Police began planning an organization-wide computer system, 
quickly dubbed ‘INCIS 2’ by the media (Pamatatau 2001).    The Police now claimed 
to reject large scale IS projects, rather claiming developments should be ‘incremental, 
evolutionary and modular, acknowledging that there is no 'silver bullet' solution for 
Police IT requirements (Police 2001, 6).’  
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Failure in Information Technology Systems   
Failure is a social construct and perceptions of what is and is not failure can vary 
between persons, and over time (Bovens and Hart 1996).  Opinions differ to what 
extent failure is a normal part of public policy, or whether it is an unusual, if 
sometimes spectacular, event seized on by the media for the sake of eye-catching 
headlines (Bovens, Paul, and Peters 2001).  What distinguishes IS failure from other 
failures in the public sector, however, is its overwhelming ubiquity.  Indeed, while 
some writers might claim failure in IS development is unusual, the bulk of the 
research suggests that failure might even be the norm.  As Mahaney and Lederer 
(1999, 291) note, ‘because this problem has endured for three decades, many IS 
professionals have accepted failure as inevitable’.  That these failures, both in the 
public and private sector, do not receive the media and other coverage that might be 
expected given the huge sums involved, says as much about the control of information 
and the ‘spin’ on stories, as it does about any ‘reality’ of failure.  
 
Within IS circles there is some debate as to what constitutes failure or success and 
Bascarini notes that ‘a standardized definition of project success does not exist, nor [is 
there] an accepted methodology for measuring it’ (Bascarini 1999).  Indeed, what is 
counted as failure ‘depends on who you ask’ and perceptions of success and failure 
may change over time (Kiel 1994; Larsen and Myers 1999).  The Standish Group sees 
success in narrow terms if a project is delivered on time and on budget, with functions 
and features delivered as originally specified.  Shenar et al (1999) argue there are four 
dimensions to IT success. 
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1. Project efficiency, which is the extent to which the project is completed on 
time and on budget. 
2. Impact on the customer, measured by the extent to which the project meets 
its scope or functional requirements. 
3. Business and direct success, which is the direct impact of the project on 
the organization and the degree of beneficial change that occurs because of 
the project. 
4. Preparation for the future for the organization.  
Bascarini simplifies these factors into two.  First, ‘project management success’ as the 
projects conformity to specified time, cost and function requirements, and second, 
‘product success’ as the effects of the final product and its fitness for the purpose 
(Bascarini 1999).  Heeks and Bhatnagar (1999, 56) distinguish between total failure 
‘in which a proposed reform is never implemented or implemented but soon 
abandoned’ and partial failure in ‘which reform is implemented but has something 
wrong with it’.  KPMG has defined ‘runaway projects’ to be those that overrun their 
projected budget or completion date by more than 30 percent, while others have 
proposed an overrun on budget or timeframe of 100 percent as a measure of failure 
(Cole 1995; Glass 1998).  Larsen and Myers (1999, 399) suggest that ‘success and 
failure can only be determined by considering the opinions of the stakeholders.’  This 
approach has limitations however.  Assessments are going to differ depending on the 
stakeholder, be they programmers, consultants, management or end users, and may 
change over time, as Larsen and Myers found, and as we have seen with IBM’s 
response to the INCIS fiasco.  This means that at some point someone will be making 
a judgement on the status of the project – and often this judgment will be dependent 
on the interpretation of events by a scholar or consultant, which may draw on, but be 
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quite in contrast to, the beliefs of various shareholders.  In any event, on any of these 
definitions, the INCIS was a failure and more-or-less a total one.  It achieved virtually 
none of its proposed functions, was faced with time and cost overruns, and ultimately 
abandoned. 
 
Why do Information System Projects Fail? 
The question arises why do IS projects fail?  Heeks provides a checklist of Critical 
Failure Factors, seen in Table 1.  In their compelling study of IT failures, IT 
journalists Collins and Bicknell provide an checklist of factors that point to failure 
(Collins and Bicknell 1997).  These are outlined in Table 2.  While useful, a factor 
approach has been critiqued by a number of writers.  First, ‘the factor approach tends 
to view implementation as a static process instead of a dynamic phenomenon, and 
ignores the potential for a factor to have varying levels of importance at different 
stages of the implementation process (Larsen and Myers 1999, 398)’.  Second, the 
relationship between the factors is often unexplained (Ginzberg 1981; Lucas 1981).  
Indeed, the approach can assume that that each factor is an independent variable and 
underplays the interaction between them (Bussen and Myers 1997; Nandhakumar 
1996a; Nandhakumar 1996b).  Third, a number of studies have shown a lack of 
consistency in the importance of factors and few have been important in all cases 
(Kwon and Zmud 1987).  Fourth, the factor approach is claimed, perhaps unfairly, to 
be overly mechanist while underplaying the importance of such things as 
organisational culture in development and the importance of the political, social and 
environmental context within and outside the organisation (Bussen and Myers 1997; 
Nandhakumar 1996a; Nandhakumar 1996b).  This last criticism would be difficult to 
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sustain in relation to Heeks’ critical factor approach, which explicitly takes account of 
such environmental, cultural and political factors. 
 
 Rather than simply ticking a checklist of factors, other accounts of IT failure 
have adopted and applied various theories of organisational and individual behaviour, 
often reflecting the then current management fad.  What is called the interpretive 
approach sees humans as ‘active makers of their physical and social reality’ (Larsen 
and Myers 1999, 398) and not ‘merely an inactive although problematic part of a 
system, something that can be optimised through selection, education and training’ 
(Mourtisen and Bjorn-Andersen 1991, 312).  The ‘Progress research stream’ literature 
has focussed on the relationships between IS developers and end-users and the effect 
of the IS on organisations (Kwon and Zmud 1987).  Heeks, expanding on his Critical 
Failure Factors, has noted the noted that ISDs are ‘social systems…rooted in a context 
of people and social structures’ (Heeks and Bhatnagar 1999, 55).  
 
Controlling Failure Through a ‘Learning Organisation’ 
Other studies have seen IS failure as a problem of learning where organisations fail to 
learn from external and internal sources, and fail to moderate beliefs and behaviour in 
the face of failure, such as persisting in IS developments longs after they have proved 
to be unfeasible (Irani, Sharif, and Love 2001; Lyytinen and Robey 1999; Wastell 
1999).  Organizations fail to learn, it is claimed, because of limits imposed by such 
thing as information overload, high turnover of skilled staff, embedded ways of 
thinking, the drawing of strong conclusions from limited individual experiences and 
an inability (and lack of incentives) to draw lessons from previous failure (which are 
often forgotten in any event) (Lyytinen and Robey 1999).  The separation of IS from 
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other units within a business and its overwhelming technological and engineering 
background can also isolate IT specialists from wider issues and learning.  Over time, 
it is claimed, organizations ‘accept and expect poor performance while creating 
organizational myths that perpetuate short-term optimization’ (Lyytinen and Robey 
1999,85).  The high levels of stress and anxiety involved for participants in IS projects 
also undermine learning (Wastell 1999).  Groups and individuals cope with this stress 
through ‘defense-avoidance behavior patterns’ such as reliance on organizational 
ritual, political infighting, and isolationism where groups develop a laager mentality 
and an inward looking, mutually-supporting and outwardly suspicious ‘groupthink’ ('t 
Hart 1994).  These defenses work to avoid having to engage with the problems in the 
project, and face up to and learn from these problems (Wastell 1999).  Failure then, it 
is claimed, will be reduced by creating incentives for organization and individuals to 
learn such as rewarding bearers of bad news and mistakes, providing a supportive 
environment for learning, integrating IS within the wider organization, and a broader 
focus of IS developers away from their mainly technical focus (Lyytinen and Robey 
1999,85; Wastell 1999).   
 
While it possibly provides some genuine insights, the ‘learning organisation’ 
literature upon which Lyytinen and Robey, and Wastell have drawn has been much 
critiqued.  It has been seen as naive and utopian and as having questionable empirical 
foundations (Salaman 2001; Symon 2001).  It has been seen as having a moral 
foundation that is at odds with the ethics actually prevalent within firms (Snell 2001).  
It is unclear as to what learning actually is and who (the organisation or the 
individual) is carrying out the learning (and sometimes the two are conflated in any 
event) (Popper and Lipshitz 2000).  It underplays the barriers that exist to learning due 
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to the strong culture, hierarchy and rituals of organisations, and the ‘paradigm’, 
‘discourse’ or belief systems, mostly external to the organisation, within which 
managers work and which rule out some options and constrain others (Salaman 2001).  
And, like any fad, it may already be losing the appeal it once had to consultants, 
scholars and practitioners (Symon 2001). 
 
The question also arises how relevant some of the ‘learning organization’ 
literature is to explaining IS failures, particularly in the public sector.  First, the high 
level of IT failures seems to suggest that while it would be nice if failure did lead to 
learning, or that there would be learning if just the right culture and organizational 
structure existed, there is little evidence for this occurring now or in the future.  This 
is despite some of the organizational literature suggesting that a high-failure and high-
risk industry such as IS industry should be one characterized by learning.  One study 
argued that ‘a high perceived likelihood of potentially costly but avoidable errors 
facilitates learning’ (Popper and Lipshitz 2000, 292).  This is because ‘failure is an 
essential prerequisite for learning as it stimulates the sort of 
experimentation…advocated for sound policy development and organizational 
management (Sitkin 1992, 243).  In contrast, Clarke and Perrow’s (1999) analysis of 
failure led them to conclude that high-technology and high risk systems did not foster 
organizational learning.  Plans supposedly to deal with failure, become ‘fantasy 
documents’, which are believed despite contrary experience, and serve to legitimate 
actions and provide comfort to management and clients, whether-or-not the 
organization has the ability to adapt to difficult situations.  In some case, these ‘plans’ 
have contributed to the failure (Clarke and Perrow 1999).   
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Second, in some cases it is unclear what it is the organization should learn so 
as to avoid IT failure.  There is no agreement on what Critical Factors or software 
development methodologies or management systems or latest management fad is 
effective in preventing IS failure.  None has been particularly successful so far.  
Despite decades of development, there are still no reliable and accurate methods of 
estimating software project size or costs and no software development methodology 
that guarantees good results.  Software estimation and project management techniques 
are reliant on the judgement of skilled individuals for success, and even the best can 
be wrong (Evans 2001).  For example, Fenton (1997) found experienced managers 
were over 50 percent wrong in estimating software costs, and some software tools 
produced results that were incorrect by 200 percent.  This was for completely 
specified projects, using experienced people and well-proven technology.  Jacobson 
(1998, 354) found that the estimated project size at the beginning of a project ‘may 
differ from the final size by a substantial percentage, say 50 percent.’ Size was 
directly related to cost, and cost increases more quickly as project size increased.  
 
Third, it is questionable how relevant some of the buzzwords of organizational 
learning such as ‘thriving on uncertainty’, ‘discovery and reinvention’, ‘maintenance 
of a broad vision’, ‘market realignment’, ‘creative thought and requirement 
satisfaction’, ‘realignment of disruptive to creative technology’, ‘realizing the 
potential for change within the expectation of each shareholder’ and so on (Brown and 
Eisenhardt 1998; Irani, Sharif, and Love 2001) are to rather staid and non-market 
driven government agencies, quite apart from what these buzzwords actually mean, 
and quite apart from the best efforts of managerialists and consultants to apply 
putative private sector management principles to the public sector.  Whether or not a 
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government agency has the latest, fastest, gee-whizzist IS system or the then-most-
popular ‘learning organization’ structure is not necessary going to affect its long-term 
viability, particularly if the agency is not competing in a market situation.  However, 
its viability, or at least its ability to meet its objectives and carry out its functions, 
might be severely undermined in a period of fiscal constraint if millions of dollars are 
spent with little result.   
 
Fourth, the literature particularly focuses on IS within a firm or an 
organization, and integrating that IS division or section to the wider needs of the 
organization.  However, as we see in the case study, organizations, particularly 
government agencies in the age of NPM and contractualism, are often dependent on 
outside consultants to advise on IS development, and for large IT companies to 
develop and supply software and hardware.  Failure might encourage learning, but it 
may be of a type not of great benefit to the purchaser.  A consultancy company might 
well learn that advising proceeding with a large IS projects is well within its interests 
and guarantees a flow of income in the future, quite apart from the value of this IS 
project to the purchaser.  It might also learn that whether their advice turns out to be 
good or not will have little relationship to its financial rewards then and in the future.  
It may well learn that advising what the management already thinks is a good idea, is 
enough to make them seem to be particularly good at their jobs and so be suitably 
rewarded.  It might also continue to argue that new management structures or 
reorganizations will fix any problems that may arise.  It is notable that consultancy 
reports on the INCIS project did not caution against IS as such, or the highly 
ambitious claims made for the INCIS system, but mainly about how the project and 
contract would be managed.  Similarly, IT companies and their salesman might learn 
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that promising largely unachievable results from highly expensive IS projects is a 
good way to subsidize their software and hardware research and add to the company’s 
profits, with little risk that contracts, however many pages they might run to, will be 
able to hold them to account.  The learning organizational literature reflect what we 
argue is the pathological faddism of IS projects, which sees problems of failure solved 
simply by applying or developing the appropriate management skills and structures or 
‘fantasy plans’.   Nor, as we will argue, is there any evidence that consultants, IT 
companies, public agencies or many practitioners and academics have learnt one of 
the key lessons of IT failure – that large and ambitious projects should be treated with 
great caution or avoided altogether.   
         
Project Escalation 
If the ‘learning organisation’ approach throws only a little light on why IS projects 
fail in such numbers are there other approaches that shed light on why large projects 
continue even after it is apparent they are failing?  Much has been written on the 
escalation of software projects and ‘run-away projects’.  Various models have been 
proposed on why projects continue even when it seems obvious the project is a failure 
and it is only a question of throwing good money after bad.  Keil, Mann, and Rai 
(2000) test four theoretical approaches to explain escalation behaviour: self-
justification theory, prospect theory, agency theory, and approach avoidance theory.  
In self-justification theory, it is argued that managers continue their commitment to a 
project to justify earlier decisions, both to themselves and to others.  In prospect 
theory, managers engage in risk seeking behaviour due to a choice between a sure loss 
– the sunk cost of the project – and possibility of a larger loss with at least some 
chance (however small) there will be a return (Kahneman and Tversky 1988).  
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Agency theory focuses on the problems faced by the principal (such as the manager or 
owner) of controlling an instrumentally rational agent (such as a programmer or IS 
developer and project manager) in a situation of information asymmetry and problems 
of monitoring where the agent may have more knowledge of the problems and an 
incentive to conceal them.  In complex software developments it is also difficult to 
ascribe blame if and when projects do meet problems.  Approach avoidance theory 
argues managers continue a project because the forces encouraging abandonment 
(restraining forces) are overpowered by the forces encouraging continuance (driving 
forces).  In particular, what is called the completion effect – which is the nearness to 
the successful completion of the project - is a strong driving force.  In IS development, 
this is particularly relevant due to the ‘90 percent completion’ syndrome where the 
proportion of the completed project increases readily to where it is estimated to be 90 
percent completed, whereafter it increases very slowly (Abel-Hamid 1988).  In some 
cases, projects are reported to be 90 percent complete for half the duration of the 
project.  In a survey of IT auditors, it was found that while all four explanations of IS 
escalation were statistically significant, the completion effect derived from the 
approach avoidance classified over 70 percent of runaway projects (Keil, Mann, and 
Rai 2000).   
 
Project Initiation 
Convincing accounts can be made of why IS projects are continued after they seem to 
be ‘runaways.’  However, we argue that what is missing from this picture is an 
explanation to why large IT projects are initiated.  Despite the predominance of large 
IT failures, there is no evidence of fewer large and ambitious projects. Even after the 
INCIS debacle in New Zealand further large projects continued to be developed in the 
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New Zealand public sector, sometimes ignoring the regulatory regime that was 
developed in response to the INCIS and other disasters (Hosking 2002).  Indeed, in 
October 2002, the government announced another large IS development in the Social 
Development Ministry at a projected cost of between $87 and $178 million, dwarfing 
even INCIS (Milne 2002, 3). 
 
To explain why large and ambitious projects continue to be initiated we 
propose a model containing four pathological enthusiasms.  Each enthusiasm is linked 
to a key player or group within public sector IT developments.  First, idolisation 
where public officials ‘use computers and are over-aware of IT’s potential.  They 
believe that IT can transform the business of government.  The public sector becomes 
awash with IT driven reform projects, which place technology at the heart of the 
change process (Heeks and Davies 1999, 27)’. Second, technophilia or ‘the myth of 
the technological fix’ where ‘the entire IS profession perpetuates the myth that better 
technology, and more of it, are the remedies for practical problems (Lyytinen and 
Robey 1999, 95).’  Third, lomanism, drawing on Arthur Miller’s archetypal salesman 
Willie Loman in the Death of a Salesman.  Lomanism is the enthusiasm, feigned or 
genuine, that sales representatives and other employees develop for their company’s 
products and skills, and that company’s ability to develop new products and 
technologies, whatever the objections or questions put forward by potential and actual 
purchasers.  Fourth, Managerial faddism.  This is the tendency for consultants and 
managers to eagerly embrace the newest management fad, methodology or utterings 
of the Management Guru of the moment – whether this be such things as the learning 
organisation, knowledge management or New Public Management in the case of the 
public sector.  It is reflected in the belief that most problems can be fixed or prevented, 
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and benefits created, by improving management structures along the lines of the new 
fad, with new IS projects often as a key element – as often seen in the Business 
Process Reengineering literature that seems to have influenced the police 
reorganisation that was carried out along with the INCIS project. It does not usually 
entail questioning the IS ambitions of management, but instead proposes how these 
might be better managed using this latest methodology or system and/or by simply 
employing better management.  Together these four enthusiasms feed off and 
mutually reinforce each other, creating a strongly held belief that new and large IS 
projects will be a good idea.  Doubters and sceptics can be portrayed as ‘negative’ 
‘Not Team Players’, ‘Not Helpful’ or, particularly in a public sector influenced by 
NPM and economic models of behaviour such as public choice, as ‘vested’ or ‘rent-
seeking’ interest groups, again to some extend seen in the response to critics of IT 
changes within the New Zealand police force.  Together these pathologies make up 
the Four Enthusiasms of IT Apocalypse seen in Figure 1.  When a project does enter 
problems, these four enthusiasms can also undermine attempts to curtail or abandon 
the project – a project can always be fixed with better management, or more 
technology or better programming. 
 
Technological Fixes and Managerial Faddism 
The INCIS project contained an unfortunate mix of technical and managerial faddism.  
The Police had a fairly well entrenched attitude that technology would solve all their 
problems – very much the classic ‘idolisation’ noted by Heeks.  Indeed, SSC officials 
noted that police were ‘carried away by the wonder of it all’, while ex-contractors 
noted the Police’s excessive confidence in IT, despite their limited experience of it.  
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The highly sophisticated functions required for INCIS had not been achieved 
elsewhere in the world and may not be for some time, and the ‘architecture’ of the 
project was unusual and complex.  INCIS was a highly complex research project - a 
‘bleeding edge’ development – IS jargon for complex and ambitious developments 
where the ‘blood is on the floor’.  That technical specifications were changed several 
times during the life of the project did not reduce this complexity. 
 
If developing an innovative and large scale IS projects was not complex 
enough, a large scale reorganisation of police management structures was also carried 
out – a ‘Business Process Reengineering’ (BPR) 11 tied to the Community Policing 
Project known as Policing 2000.  INCIS and Policing 2000 were initially planned as 
being intertwined, with Policing 2000 as ‘the name of the program within which 
INCIS and other change and development projects are being integrated, planned and 
implemented’ (Phillippson and Doone 1995). This Business Process Engineering, to 
use the Police jargon of the time: 
seeks a dramatic improvement in performance.  It focuses an organisation on customer 
services and analyses processes in terms of value of the service to the customer.  It develops a 
vision of future performance for each process, and eliminates, combines, simplifies or replaces 
activities, or whole processes, which are not adding optimum value.  BPR uses technology, 
particularly IT, as an enabler of performance improvement.  It relies on the introduction of 
rigorous performance measurement as a guide to both initial and ongoing performance 
improvements.  
 
The changes contemplated for Policing 2000 will be more demanding than Police have ever 
before attempted (Luxton 1995, Appendix A, 10-11).  
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While the report to the Cabinet State Sector committee stated in bold print that 
‘Policing 2000 is not about job cuts.’ (Luxton 1995, Appendix A, 9), it involved the 
‘downsizing’ of 500 positions, although these were not ultimately carried through due 
to political pressure.   
 
As the Police themselves later noted, Policing 2000 added to the complexity 
and difficulty of the project and so to delays experienced.  In February 1996, the 
Deputy Commissioner of Police and Secretary of Treasury wrote to the Ministers of 
Police and Finance seeking an extension of time for reporting due to ‘ complexities 
inherent and the sequencing of events in applying business process re-engineering 
methodologies which are required to support new technology design’ and that Police 
had ‘broadened the scope of their work from primarily an operational focus in an 
INCIS solution to an organisation-wide business process re-engineering and a number 
of business and technology project solutions including INCIS (Small 2000, 48).  
When INCIS failed, the Police were left with an organisational structure which relied 
on a non-existent computer system.  That the Police embraced one management fad 
and carried out a massive reorganisation of their organisation at the same time as 
developing a large IS does seem to be of questionable wisdom, but it is not unusual in 
IS failures (Collins and Bicknell 1997). 
 
The Impossibility of Control  
IS projects may be particularly difficult to control in the public sector.  There are three 
issues here.  First, the difficulty of monitoring of ISDs to try and keep them from 
going off the rails.  Second, questions of accountability arise if and when the project 
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does go off the rails.  Third, public sector ISDs must be managed in an environment 
subject to legislative change. 
 
Responsibility in Bureaucratic systems 
In a Westminster system such as New Zealand, ministers hold a vicarious 
responsibility for the decisions and omissions of their departments and the employees 
of their departments, in theory at least.  That this vicarious responsibility, let alone the 
personal responsibility of the minister for his/her own actions, is not taken as 
seriously as some constitutional scholars would prefer, and may have been 
undermined somewhat by the doctrinaire application of NPM to the New Zealand 
public sector, has been much commented on (Goldfinch 1998; Gregory 1998).  It is a 
principle that still has some force, however, at least amongst some voters and scholars.  
However, in complex IS projects that may last several years, there may be a number 
of ministers coming and going, as is the case of the INCIS project where there were 
four ministers, culminating in a Ministerial Group when things became too bad to 
ignore.  These ministers may or may not be aware of the project and any problems it 
is facing, and so may not be in a position to ameliorate any of the effects.  Nor in the 
age of NPM would ministers usually involve themselves in the operational matters of 
their departments until problems become too large and politically damaging to ignore.  
Because of these factors, in the case of failure, it may be difficult to hold one 
individual minister responsible, even if that minister did approve the original project.  
It might be easier to pin the blame on a particular government – as the Labour 
Government after 1999 has tried to do in the case of INCIS.  However, if it is difficult 
to ascribe blame for dramatic disasters that have a seemingly simple cause-effect 
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relationship (Gregory 1998), it is vastly more difficult to hold ministers and 
governments to account for highly complex software and hardware development 
projects where it is demanding enough to explain what actually happened and why 
failure occurred, let alone who is responsible.  
 
If conventions of ministerial responsibility provides little hope for 
accountability, let alone for the control of projects, could the chief executive, senior 
manager, or project sponsor be in a position to avoid project failure and be held to 
account if things do go wrong?  This again will be difficult.  The problem of 
complexity and blame-ascribing arises.  It may be that it is beyond the power and 
expertise of the CE or manager to control the project, even if she attempted to do so.  
In the case of a manager being highly linked to the project itself, one might find 
problems already noted of self-justification, prospect, agency, ‘keeping mum’ and 
completion effects.  This may possibly be seen in the INCIS failure where the Police 
Commissioner was highly identified, and identified himself, with the project, and 
continued to reassure outside monitoring authorities right until the last that the project 
was on track.  For example, Doone wrote, in a letter to a magazine that ‘less 
paperwork and streamlined procedures will follow with the introduction of new 
technology, including INCIS. The new systems are late but they are coming in (Doone 
1997, 8-10).  He was also a strong proponent of the new type of ‘community policing’ 
that was to be supported by the new IT systems, and was highly linked to its supposed 
benefits (Doone 1989).  Similarly, the Project Manager Crewdson was an initiator of 
and strongly linked to the project and similarly assured doubters as to its status.  He 
was also accused of not keeping enough distance between himself and the IBM 
suppliers (Justice and Law Reform Committee 1999). The problems of control within 
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the line hierarchy were further complicated by the unusual reporting requirements 
between Batchelor (Director of IT) and Crewdson (Project Manager) and the 
personality conflicts between the two.   
 
Could front-line staff be a check on the empire building and ambitions of 
management and others when it come to developing large IS systems?  Front-line staff, 
such as police in the INCIS project, might well be able to provide a ‘reality check’ on 
IS developers and management.  However, widespread opposition to the INCIS 
project did not have any effect in containing it.  In the unlikely event that the INCIS 
project was successful in achieving its technological aims, this hostility may have 
undermined the success of the system.  Indeed, a leading factor that leads to computer 
failure is the reluctance or inability of end users to adapt to the new technology, or in 
some cases, where end-users actively subvert the computerisation process (Al-Gahtani 
and King 1999; Collins and Bicknell 1997).  There was little effort put into 
convincing the front line police that the INCIS project would be in their benefit and 
there is evidence of great scepticism amongst front line police, both in relation to the 
INCIS project and to the Community Policing project with which it was heavily 
intertwined.  Front line Police made their opposition to the restructuring process and 
Community Policing well known.  Greg O'Conner, the head of the Police Association 
during most of the INCIS, claimed that the Community Policing Strategy had 
undermined the effectiveness of front line police, undervalued ‘firm but fair police 
officers’ respected by the criminal fraternity, led to the dominance of the police force 
by ‘academics’, used up valuable resources and reduced the overall effectiveness of 
the Police force in ‘fighting crime’.  Dave Wilkinson, an ex-policeman noted in 
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magazine interview that ‘if there's a pub fight a computer isn't going to stop you 
getting bottled’ (Chamberlain 1997, 39). 
 
This problem of control within government agencies may be facilitated by the 
structures of bureaucratic organisations.  It may be that government or business 
bureaucracies are particularly prone to difficulties of control in IT systems.  Various 
critiques of bureaucratic structures have noted the tendencies of members to follow 
commands even if they are misguided, and for responsibility and initiative to be 
discouraged (Merton 1957).  While bureaucratic structures can be highly effective in 
times of stability, they can lack the flexibility to adapt in periods of rapid change and 
uncertainty (Beetham 1996; Crozier 1964).  Studies of bureaucracies have also noted 
that members can withhold and distort information to superiors when it is in their 
interests to do so, which is in accord with problems of ‘keeping mum’ found in IS 
failures (Crozier 1964).  There may also be a tension between authority from expertise 
and authority from position, particularly in a highly complex fields as IS development 
where line management may be supervising people with highly specialist skills which 
management do not necessarily understand (Beetham 1996). Appointment may be 
made on seniority and the political behaviour of officials rather than simply merit, 
which again can be dangerous in highly complex specialist fields as IS development.  
As far as bureaucracies go, police forces are reasonably exemplary ones with strong 
hierarchical structures and culture, and with deference to superiors, to the extent that 
officers are given quasi-military ranks, and promotion often proceeds by seniority 
(Paoline, Myers, and Worden 2000).  In such a culture, problems are not necessarily 
going to be brought to the attention of management or questions asked of the wisdom 
of the project, especially if the project is personally identified with the Police 
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Commissioner.  Nor are ‘front-line’ grumbles going to be treated as carefully as they 
should, especially if the hierarchical cultures sits (however uneasily) with public 
choice and NPM notions of management-knows-best and the treatment of 
professional groups as rent-seeking interest groups.  This culture may have clashed 
considerably with individualistic, heroic culture of the programmer and the faddish 
culture of the consultant and IT company employees (Figure 2).12  Indeed, in one 
interview a contractor noted the rather difficult relationship between police line 
management and the programmers and that Police believed ‘they [could] do anything’, 
while Price Waterhouse audits also mention the difficult relationship, as noted.   
Unfortunately, in the era of NPM and the application of putative private sector 
management practises to the public sector, one of the aspects of bureaucracy that may 
have been of benefit in moderating IS failure has been undermined – that of 
conservatism and the suspicion of change.  Some suspicion of change and of new and 
flashy IS innovations may have tempered some of the overblown expectations 
regarding the INCIS system.  Instead, there may have been the worst of all worlds – a 
gee-whizz managerial NPM, and a heroic IS development culture, sitting atop of a 
largely traditional bureaucracy.  
Control through Contracts 
The growth of contractualism and New Public Management has partly been in 
response to perceived failings of the bureaucratic model.  If large public or private 
bureaucracies have failings that make it difficult to control complex problems, then 
possibly a contractual type of relationship where-by outsourced IS experts are 
contracted to provide the appropriate services may provide a solution.  However, there 
is considerable evidence that contracts are not effective in controlling projects and 
providing sanctions when IS project fail.   
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The New Zealand public sector is often seen as the most doctrinaire example 
of the application of contractualism to the public sector, heavily influenced by agency 
theory and transaction cost analysis (Goldfinch 1998).  Indeed, the concern with 
contractual modes of management approaches fetishisation in the New Zealand public 
sector, with a vast array of public services and public service appointments provided 
for by contracts outside and within public sector agencies.  Large contracts for IS 
projects are not unusual, nor is the naive belief that contracts will project purchasers 
against problems if and when they do arise – a belief that generally turns out to be 
mistaken (Collins and Bicknell 1997).  However, there seems to be a particular 
reliance on the contract in the case of INCIS – whether this reflects the influences of 
the contractual culture of the New Zealand public service or the management style of 
Police is unclear.  The Police’s reliance on the contract was despite cautions raised 
regarding the adequacy of contract.  For example, IBM and the Police proceeded to 
sign a fixed-price contract, in spite of warnings (including warnings in the Ernst and 
Young report they used for the business case) that they were not ready to do so (Ernst 
&Young 1993).   
 
Difficulties in controlling the process were made difficult by problems in the 
design of the contract.  Technology substitution clauses included in the INCIS 
contract served to void warranties on the software.  IBM was happy to accommodate 
variations in the specification of INCIS, provided no warranty was required. The 
fixed-price contract was considered by the Police to be a guarantee that IBM would 
pay any overrun costs.  However IBM, for their part, believed that it was politically 
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impossible for the Police to walk away from INCIS and that they could pass on extra 
development costs to the Police (Small 2000).   
 
Changes in the legislative environment faced by the Police may have also 
undermined the contract.  Crewdson, for example, claimed $14 million of the INCIS 
cost overruns were because of changes to the requirements of INCIS, such as 
legislative changes. While the INCIS contract had an ‘off-ramp’, whereby the project 
could be terminated at an early stage (required to be used between 29 September and 
15 December 1995) with no fault found, this option was not exercised.  
 
Monitoring by Central Agencies 
Could central agencies monitor public sector projects and point out failure?  They 
might not be particularly interested in doing so in the age of NPM and ‘leaving 
managers to manage’, at least until ‘the IT hits the fan’ (Iacovou 1999).  In the case of 
New Zealand, the central computing body, Government Computing Services, was 
corporatised in 1987 and then ‘privatised’ in 1994 and there may not be the expertise 
or resources to adequately monitor other agencies, even within the central agencies 
such as the Treasury and the State Services Commission (SSC).  Early in the 1990's 
there was little effective control and monitoring of IT project implementation by 
either the Treasury or the SSC (the agency responsible for overall management of the 
public sector).  The decentralisation of the public sector under NPM inspired reforms 
further weakened this central control as departmental chief executives were given 
greater managerial autonomy and the role of the SSC was reduced. The Police were 
further removed from the control of the central agencies as they are not part of the 
core public service and are largely governed by their own act of Parliament, the Police 
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Act 1958.  In December 1997, the Police INCIS project agreed to comply voluntarily 
with the monitoring regime, and sent copies of their internal and independent audit 
reports to the SSC for the December 1997 and March 1998 quarters. In May 1998 
Cabinet directed that INCIS be subjected to the monitoring regime being conducted 
by the SSC, and on 12 June 1998, the SSC wrote to Police reiterating this.   
 
After the central agencies became more actively involved in the monitoring of 
INICS, the Police consistently assured them that the project was progressing well.  
For example, during the period 1997/98, the Select Committee reported that most of 
‘the responses to us from the Police were positive in outlook and conveyed, 
particularly with regard to INCIS, an impression that everything was on track.’ The 
Ministerial inquiry noted the ‘INCIS Project was subject to the usual state sector 
reporting and approval processes, but the SSC were aware of failures by Police to 
report in accordance with the requirements of Cabinet (Small 2000, 186-7).’ Police 
did not report at all to Cabinet between January 1996 and January 1998.  Even when 
reporting, the Police were not always entirely co-operative with monitoring agencies 
or Parliament.  As the select committee noted: 
... issues of commercial sensitivity continued through the lifetime of the INCIS project. If we 
had accepted the Police's position, we would effectively have been accepting that no IT 
project in any department within our terms of reference could be subject to in-depth scrutiny 
by the committee (Waitai 1999).  
 
While monitoring regimes have tightened in New Zealand since the INCIS and 
other disasters, they have not prevented further computer disasters and are unlikely to 
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do so in the future.  Departments have often ignored them in any event (Hosking 
2002).  Given the problems of information and agency already mentioned, even if 
there was a will, resources and expertise available to monitor projects, there would 
still be difficulties.  This would particularly be the case if the organisation being 
monitored is less than cooperative or cites such things as ‘commercial sensitivity’ - as 
with the New Zealand Police.   In any event, the monitoring agencies only became 
important when it was obvious to all that the project was in severe difficulty and when 
it was largely too late to do anything about it.  Decisive and early(ish) termination of 
the project when problems became apparent, while discussed, never became an 
actuality.   
 
Controls outside the Public Sector  
Employing external consultants may provide a check on the IS activities of public 
agencies, but will this also face the same problems of agency and informational 
limitations.  Consultants may face an incentive to continue to support a project if their 
income is reliant on this project being initiated and continuing.  If the consultant had 
earlier supported a project, she may also be prey to the same pressure of self-
justification and completion effects.  A consultant can also be open to the same 
pressures of groupthink, especially if he or she is strongly tied to the project.  In the 
INCIS project, there was some concerns raised regarding aspects of the contract and 
management of the project, but none questioned the need for a large ISD.  There may 
be cases where consultants have advised that large projects should not be attempted, 
or that they should be quickly abandoned as things go wrong before too much is spent, 
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but the literature does not seem to provide many examples.  If and when the project 
fails, few consultants seem to have suffered ill-effects or been held responsible.   
 
Could the IS suppliers themselves be a check on over ambitious projects?  
There are cases of IS companies informing purchasers that what they are suggesting is 
over ambitious, despite the incentives to agree to take on the project.  Some writers on 
IT have alluded to the conservatism of IT engineers and their willingness to downplay 
what they can achieve (Glass 1999).  Others however, have written of the heroic 
nature of programming culture where difficulties and possible failure are just further 
challenges to be solved by hugely talented programmers (Bronson 1999; Swanson 
1988).  Other note the particular technological focus of many IT and IS specialist, 
which may add to the culture clash and inattentiveness to problems of failure and 
appropriateness to the organisation.  As Lyytinen and Robey (1999, 94) note: 
The profession of ISD is characterized by specialized training and circumscribed theorizing.  
Since the dawn of business computing, training in IS has meant ‘computer training’, and IS 
professionals remain technologists at heart.  Unfortunately, a technologist’s perspective does 
not encourage an accurate diagnosis of the role of computing in business strategy and 
operations. 
Added to this heroic ‘technophilia’ is the ‘lomanism’ and managerial faddism of  
salespersons and IT company employees, who are often quite willing to agree with 
whatever the purchasers wish to purchase.  In the case of INCIS, despite a number of 
failures already in the police force, there was never a question whether the large, 
radical and ‘bleeding edge’ INCIS-type project was the appropriate way to proceed.  
Indeed, no one in the police, the monitoring agencies or the external consultants, ever 
asked whether a large computerisation process was justified at all.   IBM had little 
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incentive to disabuse the Police of the notion that IT can solve vast problems.  On the 
other hand, in the INCIS case we find instances where even IBM cautioned against 
the achievability of proposed applications, but their cautions were disregarded by the 
Police, who pressed to continue.  So the ‘idolisation’ of IT by the purchasers may 
even override cautions that are given by the suppliers.  
 
Reporting Problems 
Control, monitoring and ascribing blame is difficult in IS projects.  The mis-reporting 
problems seen in INCIS have also been seen in a host of other IS failures.  That 
members of organisations are reluctant to be the bearer of bad news is a well-reported 
phenomenon (Tesser and Rosen 1972).  IS developments are no different, with bad 
news often under reported, concealed and sometimes even falsified in IS failures 
(Collins and Bicknell 1997; Heeks 1999; Smith, Keil, and Depledge 2001).   Even 
internal IS auditors have been found to be reluctant to report problems for various 
organisational reasons including (sometimes justified) fears for their own future 
within the organisation (Keil and Robey 2001).  Even when they have reported 
problems, these have often been ignored by their superiors (Keil and Robey 2001).   
 
IS problems may be particularly susceptible to under or false reporting.  First, 
‘even though they know an IS project is behind schedule, observers may lack 
confidence in their understanding of the actual extent of the trouble [as] most IS 
projects involve software development, and its intangible nature makes it difficult to 
estimate the proportion of work that has been completed (Smith, Keil, and Depledge 
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2001, 191).’ Second, the ‘scope of IS projects is often dynamic, and a projects 
boundaries may shift over time.  While an observer may suspect that an IS project is 
in trouble, (s)he may not be completely sure and, therefore, his or her willingness to 
report …may be reduced (Smith, Keil, and Depledge 2001, 191)’.   Third, there is a 
temptation for the project manager to simply ‘tick the boxes’ for project reporting, so 
as to back to the ‘real work’ of implementation.  Management are frequently satisfied 
by this subterfuge, and are uninterested in the messy details of implementation.  
Management may be afraid of asking ‘stupid’ questions about the project for fear of 
losing prestige (Collins and Bicknell 1997).   
 
This bring us to the conclusion of this section – not surprisingly, IS projects are 
extremely difficult to monitor.  When things go wrong it is difficult to find those 
responsible and hold them to account.  Nor do we believe that IS failure is simply a 
case of ‘bad management’ or stupidity, as much of the IS literature and some reports 
on INCIS imply.  It may be that the complexity, uncertainty and risk in large IS 
developments, the complexity of personal relationships and the fallibility of humans, 
is such that by their very nature large IS projects are subject to a great probability of 
failure.  We are also highly sceptical that some new management or technological 
silver bullet will greatly ameliorate this problem.  Nor it is simply a question of 
finding super-managers immune to the failings found in other managers in IS failures.  
We are doubtful such manager-heroes exist.  At best, the ‘learning organisation’ or 
clearer lines of accountability, or other management innovations, may make it easier 
for senior management to find out if a project is off the tracks.  But even then, this bad 
news may not be wanted or ‘heard’ and may not lead to termination or modification of 
the project.  Even crisis management may not work after it becomes apparent a project 
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is off-course.  Changes to management structure as the problems in INCIS became 
obvious, including the establishment of ministerial and officials’ committees, did not 
save the project.  Management improvements will not necessarily stop, for the reasons 
outlined, ambitious and largely unachievable projects being initiated and large 
amounts of money being spent before the project’s ultimate failure and abandonment.  
As we have already noted the problems of IS failure is much to with particular 
enthusiasms involved in the initiation and continuance of projects.   
 
This leads us to the pessimistic conclusion that large IS projects are likely to 
fail, whatever the management or monitoring structure.  Rather than continually 
seeking to control and moderate failure through new structures or monitoring regimes 
to report on project overruns – although these may be worthy aims in themselves – it 
may be better to avoid large and ambitious projects altogether and use already 
developed and proven technology to achieve modest aims. 
 
Pessimism as an IS Management Tool 
The INCIS failure may be a worst-case scenario in that it did most things wrong.  In 
this it is an ‘exemplary failure’.  We have discussed aspects of this exemplary failure 
including, first, an extremely ambitious scope, developing new and unproven 
technology and attempting applications never achieved elsewhere.  Second, increasing 
the complexity of the project by attempting organisational change at the same time 
and by changing technical specifications during the project development.  Third, a 
naive faith in the enforceability of the contract between the police and IBM on the 
part of the police, and a belief in the contracts as a control device.  Fourth, skill 
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deficits and management problems within the police, including tensions between 
members of the project.  From the first, INCIS showed many of the key indicators of 
forthcoming failure such as: misreporting of results, timetable slippages, the non-
delivery of applications and budget overruns, and tensions with the supposed users of 
the system – the front line police.  Attempts to salvage the project by managerial 
reorganisation and the involvement of a greater range of experts, politicians and 
officials did not succeed.   
 
 It may be that the INCIS project is a unique and possibly tragic-comedic 
failure and so little can be learnt from it that will be of relevance to other public 
managers.  What is particularly striking about INCIS, however, is the degree to which 
it repeats many of the same mistake found in other IS failures.  There also seems little 
evidence that even the New Zealand public sector has learned much from the INCIS 
failure with large projects continuing and government enthusiasm for technology 
shifting its focus to ambitious claims made for ‘E-government’.  If our model of four 
enthusiasms of IS development describes how IS initiation might unfold, it suggests 
that large IS projects, and their subsequent failures, are destined to be with us for a 
while yet. 
 
 What then is to be done?  Much of the writing on IS failure suffers from what 
Oakeshott (1962) might term ‘rationalism’, that is, a belief that there is some 
‘technique’ that can be applied to IS developments that will fix them once and for all.  
That failure is so common still is because that right technique – a new programming 
style, a new management fad, a new consultancy template or whatever – has not been 
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discovered yet.  Or if it has, it has not yet been applied.  In the face of such optimism, 
and the four enthusiasms of ISD we have outlined, we suggest a pessimism when it 
comes to IS development.  This is a belief that we do not fully understand the 
processes involved in IS developments, that their complexity makes them difficult if 
not impossible to control and that large IS development are likely to fail.  Rather than 
simply a technical exercise of software engineering, the application of ‘management 
science’ and the talents of brilliant managers, or the bringing-in of highly skilled 
consultants, or even just some healthy combination of all of these, IS developments in 
the public sector are a potent and dangerous mixture of highly challenging technical 
problems, the frailties of humans and management systems, personality and other 
conflicts, problems of agency and information, legislative instability, and clashes of 
cultures between public servants, software developers, consultants and salesman and 
their respective organisations, amongst other things.  If one thing characterises large 
IS developments, it is this incredible complexity.  That these developments are often 
combined with other large-scale re-organisations, and that technical and other 
specification changes are sometimes made during the development process, only 
compounds this complexity.  We do not believe that for the foreseeable future that 
some technique or techniques will be able to manage this complexity.  Indeed, as 
expectations continue to grow regarding IT and IS, it may be that any improvements 
made in ‘techniques’ will be outpaced by the increasing demands made by complexity 
on all-too-human managers, public servants, software designers and other members of 
the IS industry.   
  
Does this pessimism, this expectation of failure, imply an abandonment of IS 
development?  In some case, yes.  In the INCIS case, pessimism would have 
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hopefully prevented the project initiation and potentially saved $NZ100 million.  This 
could have been spent more productively on the upgrading of police cars and 
buildings or ‘fighting crime’.  The Police could have continued using the clunky and 
outdated Wanganui computer for a few more years, possibly without great loss, which 
is what happened anyway.  If the billions that have been poured away on IS 
developments in public sectors for no benefit, or even for systems less effective than 
their predecessors, had instead been spent on such prosaic things as schools, decent 
public transport and so on, with the large IS projects never actually initiated, we are 
prepared to go out on a limb and say that this would have been a good thing.  This is 
dramatically underlined when a number of large IS failures have occurred in 
developing countries that are unable or unwilling to supply even the most basic public 
goods to their citizens.    
  
 Does pessimism imply that all technological advancement and IS 
developments should be abandoned and that we can do no better than we are doing 
now?  Critics of philosophical pessimism suggest that it would – that pessimism is the 
‘enemy of hope’ (Tallis 1997).  However, even Oakeshott, who is often identified 
with philosophical pessimism, is reluctant to embrace an all-or-nothing approach.  He 
criticises Hayek’s Road to Serfdom for that very reason, seeing Hayek’s total rejection 
of planning as just another ideology (Oakeshott 1962, 21).  In this case the pessimism 
we are advocating is not a ‘technological nihilism’ a belief that all is hopeless, but 
simply a rejection of the enthusiasms of IS development, and a belief that large IS 
projects will usually not deliver their claimed benefits and will be nearly impossible to 
control and prevent from failing.  This is not to say that small, modest and proven 
technological developments could not be of some benefit to the public sector. 
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 How would this pessimism work in practice?  At its most basic level, it raises 
the question whether new IS developments are of benefit at all.  In the ‘black box’ of 
public management decision-making, it is often the solution – which might be 
restructuring along NPM lines or investment in IS or whatever - that is thought of first.  
The problem that this solution is to solve often comes after, or not at all.  If the first 
step then, is to ask what is to be achieved and what problem (and there should really 
be a problem) is to be solved, the next question becomes: can we solve this problem 
without investment in further IS?  Can some minor adjustment to current systems of 
management or IS deliver benefits without great costs and great disruption?  If the 
costs, uncertainties and risks of change are great, do they potentially outweigh the 
costs and difficulties of continuing with the way things are already done?   
 
If the decision is made to proceed with some ISD, then the question becomes 
how can this be done with the least disruption and the least cost, and with the least 
risk and uncertainty.  The wrong answer would be to decide to invest in a high-risk, 
highly ambitious ‘bleeding edge’ large development which has a very high probability 
of failure, such as INCIS.  A more sensible solution might be to examine what is 
currently working in the market place and try to buy something off-the-shelf that can 
be demonstrated to work.  However, it would not do to buy a system that did not fit 
the organisation’s needs, and then adapt this to particular legislative and 
organisational conditions.  Once adaptations are attempted on an existing system, 
however well it might work in its home country or public sector, the probability of 
failure again becomes large (Collins and Bicknell 1997; Heeks 1999).  If a system is 
 54 
not in existence anywhere else, then the question again should be asked again, are the 
expectations held for ISD too high?  If there is not a suitable off-the-shelf system that 
can be purchased, or one that approaches the organisation’s ‘needs’, can expectations 
be scaled back to what does exist, or can the organisation get by without further ISD, 
at least until the technology improves?  If the Police had asked these questions when 
considering INCIS, this would have increased the probability of success.  In the public 
sector, a few years longer with an obsolete system is not going to be the end of the 
world – more-or-less functional is better than no function at all - and in most cases 
won’t make much of a perceivable difference.  The Police’s continuing use of the 
Wanganui Computer has not led to the sky falling in, or an explosion of crime, or 
much of a difference at all for the outsider looking in.  If the answer is still that ISD is 
needed, then, and only then, should ISD be considered.   
 
 Once the decision is made to proceed towards an ISD, then again pessimism 
should be the guiding principle.  Aim small.  Be modest about what can be achieved 
by ISDs.  Be risk adverse.  Expect problems.  Assume the promises and enthusiasms 
of internal IS people, salespeople, consultants, management gurus, technicians and 
software engineers are unlikely to be worth much when a system fails, nor will any 
contract, even if it runs to thousands of pages.  Believe that developments will work 
only when they can be shown to work.  Realise that clashes of culture and the 
complexities of ISDs, make control and monitoring of projects almost impossible.  
Accept that there is no reason to believe that the current or proposed ISDs can better 
avoid the problems that have plagued all other ISDs for decades, or that current 
managers and programmers are somehow superior to those that have failed in the past.  
If there is to be restructuring of the organisation, this should not be tied to the ISD, but 
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carried out separately and before.  It is unwise to increase complexity by changing 
specifications during the development.  Be prepared to terminate the development if 
cost overruns, delays or non-delivery become apparent, despite claims it ‘is almost 
there’ or ‘it will be alright on the night’ (Collins and Bicknell 1997).  The system, if it 
does work, is unlikely to lead to huge job savings, or even cost savings in the short 
term, and there may be a loss of productivity until staff becomes used to its 
idiosyncrasies.  Excluding front line staff from development, while it might fit with 
the management fashion of the time, is also a high-risk strategy, and they might 
undermine the system even if it does work.   
 
Once partial solution noted by the ministerial inquiry into INCIS and taken up 
the SSC is the recommendation that IS projects be broken into ‘modules.’  SSC 
Officials recommended in an interview that these be modules of one year or $5 
million.  If the system modules provide useful functions on their own, then the loss of 
other parts of the system is not so damaging to the project outcome – ‘at least you've 
got something for your money’.  An additional safety net could be to concentrate on 
linking small modules of an IT project to small chunks of an IT budget, with 
safeguards against transferring extra funds to unsuccessful modules.13  
 
In sum, ISD is a minefield.  Rather than believing there is a simple way of 
crossing this minefield, it may be better to not cross it at all, or to make this minefield 
as simple and small as possible and reduce its complexity and scope.  Above all, it is 
best to approach this minefield suspiciously, sceptically and pessimistically, only then 
might the damage (and there will always be damage) be reduced.   
Table 1   
CRITICAL FAILURE FACTORS IN IS DISASTERS1  
Factor  Description   Factor  Description   
Information  Information and data 
inadequacies  
Cultural  Clashes with national/local 
culture 
Technical  Problems with IT such as 
incompatibility across agencies 
Structural  IS clashes with 
organisational and/or 
management structures  
People  Lack of staff with sufficient 
training, skills or inclination to 
handle or develop IT 
Strategic  IS not coordinated across 
different agencies or 
divisions  
Management  Lack of management skills, 
knowledge and training 
Political  Political infighting derails 
project 
Process  Processes are inadequate to 
integrate community or channel 
relevant information  
Environmental  Factors outside the 
organisation disrupt project 
1. Source:  Heeks and Bhatnagar (1999) 
 
 Table 2 
COLLINS AND BICKNELL’S TEN POINTERS TO IS FAILURE  
• A tendency to be overambitious 
• A feeling among computer managers that they know it all and cannot admit when they don’t. 
• A belief among the entire project team that computerisation must be a good thing, and to 
suspect otherwise is an Orwellian though-crime. 
• A chief executive who is in the best position to judge a computer project because he knows 
nothing about computers but fails to intervene – because he knows nothing about computers. 
• A readiness to accept it’ll-be-all-right-on-the-night assurance from suppliers – assurance that 
suppliers studiously avoid writing down. 
• An over reliance on consultants, who, like some vets, may have a financial interest in 
prolonging ills. 
• An avoidance of cheap, proven, off-the-shelf packages in favour of costly, unproven, custom-
built software; or worse, the tailoring of a standard proven package. 
• An unwillingness by middle and senior management to impart bad news to the board – mainly 
because the board will make known its resentment of anyone who tries. 
• The buck stops nowhere. 
• A mistaken belief that the contract makes it easy to sue the supplier if it all goes wrong. 
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Notes 
1
 Information System (IS) is a computer system combined with the organisation and personnel to 
(hopefully) produce useful output and accomplish organisational goals, as opposed to information 
technology (IT) which is a general term for computers, networking and software used in an information 
system. 
2
 The 1996/7 operating budget for the Police was $NZ783.920 million, and for 1997/8 it was 
$NZ789.961 million, including an additional $NZ20.802 million approved by Cabinet after the 1997/8  
budget round (Doone 1998).   
3
 The report also noted that ‘IBM has not been as successful in the applications delivery role as in the 
delivery of the IBM infrastructure and Police need to pay considerable attention to the effective project 
management and the necessary transfer of skills to in house staff (Ernst & Young 1993, 10).’ 
4
 On 21 Feb 1994, Williamson (1994) wrote to the Minister of Police, John Luxton and noted 
I consider the Police have opted for a higher risk solution than that which might have been 
provided by an international standard solution.  Overall, based on the assurances given, it 
would appear that the contractual obligations on the vendor are strong enough to minimise the 
risks involved...  
5
 The Police reinterpreted the external reports on the project in a more positive light than they were 
intended, disregarding the few cautions that were raised.   The business case used as one of the main 
supporting documents a report by Ernst and Young (1993), which had been supportive of the INCIS 
proposal in an earlier version, when the technical specifications had been somewhat different.  The rest 
of the report sounded a number of warnings that the Police were not ready to proceed to contract and 
that there were a number of critical issues to address. However, the upbeat executive summary of the 
Ernst and Young was still included in the INCIS business case.  As the Ministerial Inquiry commented: 
given its [the contract’s] inadequacies, why was it accepted? Presumably neither the Cabinet nor 
its advisers queried it sufficiently. ... It would seem, however, that searching questions were not 
asked with regard to risks, despite the awareness of some elements of risk evidenced by the 
Cabinet minutes approving the INCIS Project (Small 2000, 144). 
6
 The Small report noted the expected efficiency benefits as $517 million over 8 years or $303 million 
net present value. 
7
 Request for Proposal (RFP) and Request for Tender (RFT) are stages in the standard process when 
contracting for goods and services. The difference is that the response to an RFT requires a Tender 
with a firm proposal and costings. 
8
  Doone claims that the report was further modified to take into account Batchelor’s concerns and that 
the Andersen review of the project was also in response to these concerns. Batchelor had left the Police 
force by the time the report was delivered. 
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9
 Crewdson also stated: "Project management is now proceeding on the assumption that the 
Government will not be requiring Police to reduce it's capital baseline by an amount equivalent to 540 
staff and that the attrition programme is cancelled." 
10
 The distributed client-server approach to large software systems is still a complicated and difficult 
design method to use.  It requires the co-ordination of, potentially, hundreds of different software 
applications and databases on physically separate computers.  Compare this with the centralized and 
well-tried three-tier approach, where a few large central servers (or frequently only one server) provide 
software applications to many small client computers.   
11
 Business Process Reengineering is managerial jargon for changing how an organisation works by 
changing procedures, job descriptions and organisational structure to perform a new business function 
or an existing function differently. However, it may be that BPR is simply another management fad 
that has often been linked to IS developments.  Indeed, it is possible that management and IS journals 
have left BPR behind and moved on to embrace yet other fads – such as ‘knowledge management’ 
(Galliers and Newell 2000).  BPR benefits are not altogether uncontested (Davenport 1996).   Those of 
a suspicious mind might even suspect BPR is simply a new(ish) piece of managerial double-speak for 
job cuts.  Indeed, one measurement used for BPR success was simply that headcounts had been 
reduced by 75 percent (Hammer 1990).   
12
 The large degree of physical (as well as cultural) separation between those developing the INCIS 
software – some of the IBM programmers where not even in the country – compounded this problem of 
control and agency.  
13
 Recommendations of the Inquiry included the following: 
1. Business cases should reflect overall technology resources and risks as well as financial 
issues. 
2. Projects should use proven technology.  If not, there should be ‘increased risk 
management’ processes. 
3. Projects need adequate skilled and experience management. 
4. There should be separate contracts for infrastructure and applications.  
5. Independent quality assurance should be used. 
6. Contracts should only be signed when all relevant issues have been resolved. 
7. Procedures for Cabinet approval need to be tightened to assure Cabinet receives adequate 
information and an appreciation of the risks of the project. 
 
 
